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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JULIA HARRIS, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs.-
ELMO L. HARRIS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
No. 9513 
STArrEMENT OF KIND OF. CASE 
This is an actiori upon a petition and order to show 
cause why the Defendant should not be punished for fail~ 
ure to pay support 1noney payments in the amount of 
$4,605.00 and for judgment in that amount and attorneys' 
fees. Defendant pleaded an affirmative defense to the 
prayer for judgment alleging that the Plaintiff had told 
the Defendant that if the Defendant would pay ce'rtain 
creditors of Plaintiff and Defendant to prevent them 
from garnisheeing her wages and so long as Defendant 
satisfied said creditors and paid as much as he could 
reasonably afford for support money for the children 
that the Plaintiff would expect no more, and that had 
Plaintiff not so agreed Defendant would have petitioned 
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for a modification of the decree of divorce to reduce the 
amount payable as support money, and that Plaintiff 
should be estopped to seek a judgment against the De-
fendant fo;r $4,605.00, or for any amount. Defendant 
cross-petitioned for a modification of the decree of di-
vorce to reduce the support money payable for the sup-
port of the minor children of the parties from $50.00 per 
month each to $35.00 per month each, alleging changed 
circumstances, to wit: That at the time of the entry of 
the decree of divorce, Plaintiff was unemployed, but 
within two or three months thereafter she obtained steady 
employment for which she has received in excess olf 
$250.00 per month ever since. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court and the Court entered 
a judgment in favor of the Plaintiff for $4,500.00 delin-
quent suppqrt money and $100.00 attorneys' fees. The 
Court found the D·efendant guilty of contempt of court 
and sentenced the Defendant to serve thirty days in the 
county jail and denied Defendant's petition for modifica-
tion of the decree of divorce. From such denial of De-
fendant's petition for modification of the decree of di-
vorce and such judgment and' sentence of the Court, De-
fendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and order 
of the Court and every part thereof, and a new trial. 
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.__) 
In February, 1956, when the decree of· divorce was 
entered, Defendant was out of work, was financially em-
barrassed, and was suffering from a double hernia (R. 
24). Between that time and the first of January, 1959, 
Defendant held four separate jobs for limited periods of 
time, but in each case was unable beeause of his physical 
condition to continue his work (R. 24-28}. During that 
time he paid what he could to the Plaintiff for the sup-
port of the children (R. 26"'26). One of the jobs so held 
by him was for a company known as· All' Plastics with 
whom he'ohtained a position by purchasing 1,500 shares 
of capital stock of the company with $1,500.00 which he 
borrowed from his sister, Donna Petty, no ·part of which 
he has been able to repay (R. 27-28). While out of work 
he was obliged to depend upon -his sister with whom he 
lived and who took care of him (R. 29). On January 1, 
1959, Defendant was given a position with Sperry's after 
having an operation for the repair of his hernias, and 
he has worked continuously at Sperry's from that date 
until now (R. 28). ThB court stated at the conclusion of 
the evidence: 
''The Defendant is in contempt since he has 
been working at Sperry's .. " (R. 60) - . -
Defendant's average inco:r_ne is now $68.00 per week, 
$300.00 p~r month take home pay (R. 28). Defendant 
has remarried and is living with his wife (R. 30). 
Defendant's exp~nses a;re: $10.0D per month pay-
able to sister on_ $2,000.00 of loans ( R. 29) ; $71.00 per 
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month rent; $60.00 per month for groceries; $16.00 per 
month for utilities; $5.00 per month for barber; $10.00 
per month for clothes; $8.00 per month for laundry (R. 
30). He uses his wife's car, a 1955 Buick, which was 
purchased and paid for entirely by her. He maintains the 
automobile at a cost of $35.00 to $40.00 per month. It is 
necessary to his employment that he have access to an 
automobile (R. 31). He has been unable to pay a cent 
toward the purchase price of the automobile after paying 
his living expenses, $60.00 per month to Plaintiff and 
$10.00 per month to the children (R. 32). 
The children are a boy, age fourteen, and a girl, age 
ten and a half. Defendant called and talked with the girl 
nearly every day until Plaintiff started' this action. Ever 
since the divorce when in Salt Lake Defendant has visited 
with the children every week or every two weeks (R. 32). 
Plaintiff was not working at the time o£ the divorce 
and had not worked at any time while they were married 
(R. 33). Within forty-five to sixty days after the divorce 
was granted, Plaintiff obtained employment (R. 33). 
Plaintiff's present income is $325.00 per month, with 
take home pay of $275.00 (R. 34). About six months after 
the divorce her wages were garnisheed. Defendant testi-
fied that Plaintiff told hiln that if he would keep their 
creditors "off her back" she would accept whatever he 
could afford. She would get fired if they garnisheed her 
wages (R. 36-37). She said she would be happy to accept 
whatever he could afford so long as he kept the creditors 
away from her place of business (R. 36). Defendant paid 
several creditors to protect Plaintiff (R. 37). 
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The Court sustained an objection to further testi-
mony concerning bills paid by the Defendant to protect 
the Plaintiff. The Court stated: 
"I don't see that there would be any consider-
ation for her trying to get hun to pay the bills. 
Paragraph Si.x of the decree says he shall.'' (R. 
38) 
Since those conversations Defendant testified that 
he has had happy relations with the Plaintiff until the 
month of the hearing, and that he thought she was satis-
fied the way things were going; she had never indicated 
that she woUld attempt to collect any unpaid support 
money (R. 38). 
Since he has worked at Sperry's he has not miss.ed 
making a payment every month to the Plaintiff. During 
the last year or year and a half he has been paying $60.00 
per month (R. 38). 
If Defendant's wages are garnisheed he will lose 
his work. Two of his fellow employees have been dis-
chargedfor garnishments (R. 39). 
Defendant rmnarried in August, 1959. His present 
wife -bought and paid for all furniture. She must con-
tribute to maintenance of the home. .She has accumulated 
no money since they were married (R. 40) .. Defendant 
stated that he can pay $70.00 per month, the amount he 
has been paying Plaintiff and giving to the children. 
If Plaintiff had not told Defendant that she would 
be satisfied if he paid their joint creditors and kept them 
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satisfied and paid as much as he could possibly afford, 
he would have secured an attorney and had the support 
money reduced to what he could pay (R. 42). 
Defendant paid not a dime on the Buick automobile 
that his present wife bought (R. 44). The first month 
he was at Sperry's he gave Plaintiff $40.00 and has never 
missed payment since (R. 45). In 1957 he took bank-
ruptcy and discharged all o hligations except those jointly 
owed by him and Plaintiff, about $800.00 of obligations 
(R. 46). 
Defendant's present wife pays nothing on rent or 
utilities but buys food from time to time. She earns 
$220.00 per month take home pay (R. 46). 
The son of the parties told Defendant that he makes 
$40.00 per month from his paper route (R. 49). 
Plaintiff testified that she has ne~er since the entry 
of the decree of divorce, either orally or in writing, told 
the Defendant he did not have to pay the full amount of 
the money set forth in the decree, and that she has always 
asked him for more. She is living at 2222 Preston Street 
with the two children and her mother. Her sister is mar-
ried and living in Sandy (R. 52). She does not think she 
can support the children on less than $50.00 pe,r month 
each (R. 52). Plaintiff is employed at Hercules Powder 
Company earning $325.00 per month with $275.00 per 
month take home pay (R. 53). She takes credit for the 
two children as her dependents (R. 53). 
She is buying her home and paying $91.00 per month 
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therefor. Her nwther 's incmne is $102.00 per rnonth. The 
mother pays $60.00 per month into the household (R. 53). 
The house is in the narne of the mother, sister and Plain-
tiff (R. 54). The sister paid $100.00 per month for board 
and room and on the house. She made $325.00 per month 
(R.5-l:). The boy earns an average of $20.00 per month 
from his paper route (R. 55). Plaintiff has had repairs 
on the house; she has had appliances go out; the house 
needs painting; both of the children need an orthodontist; 
the boy has hay fever and ne·eds a series of shots which 
are very expensive (R. 55). 
Defendant has been carrying insurance on the chil-
dren for medical expenses and they have had about 
$800.00 of medical expenses paid by the insurance in the 
last year or two (R. 55-56). Medical insurance does not 
cover hay fever (R. 56). Plaintiff pays $9'1.00 per month 
on the hon1e, $35.00 per week for food for herself, her 
mother and the two children, leaving $200.00 per month 
for other things (R. 56). 
Plaintiff was asked what other things she needs that 
require $200.00, (R. 56). Thereupon, the Court inter-
jected: 
"I don't care to hear it. 1 know what it takes. 
I don't care what she takes othe,rwise * * * If you 
want to confine it to ·what she needs for the kid-
dies, well and good, but what she needs for her-
self and her mother, I am not intere·sted in it.'' 
(R. 56). 
Plaintiff was then asked to tell what she thinks she 
requires besides food and the rent. She answered, "Since 
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my sister left I have to have a car.'' (R. 56). The Court 
then interjected: 
''I am not interested in what this lady has to 
have. She can he rich as Croesus. She is getting 
no alimony. I am only talking about the Defend-
ant's duty to support his kiddies, what she needs 
for the kids." (R. 57). 
Plaintiff testified that the boy had two front teeth 
broken half off which need to be repaired at a cost of 
about $100.00 each. The daughter needs to go to an 
orthodontist for work to cost over $200.00 (R. 57). 
Plaintiff has taken no action of any kind against 
Defendant to collect anything more than the amounts he 
has been paying until within the last thirty days prior to 
trial. She stated that she has asked him every time she 
has seen him that she needs more money, but she has 
done nothing about any action (R. 59). Defendant testi-
fied that until the last thirty days Plaintiff has never 
complained about him not paying her enough money 
(R. 60). 
Defendant offered the sister of the Defendant, Donna 
Petty, as a witness to testify that Plaintiff had told her 
that as long as the Defendant paid the bills and paid her 
what he could that she would be satisfied. The Court 
refused to permit the witness to testify and stated: 
"That would be no consideration for that type 
of promise." (R. 60) 
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AHGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
rrhe trial court erred in entering judgment in favor 
of Plaintiff and against the Defendant for $4,500.00. The 
court misapplied the law applicable to the point at issue. 
Plaintiff sought a judg1nent for accrued and unpaid 
support money in the amount of $4,605.00. The court 
awarded judgment for $4,500.00. Defendant pleaded as 
a defense to the prayer for judgment that the Plaintiff 
told hun shortly after the divorce was entered and after 
she had been garnisheed by a judgment creditor that if he 
would satisfy joint creditors and would pay her as much 
as he could afford that she would expect no more. He 
further pleaded that had the Plaintiff not done so he 
would have petitioned for a n1odification of the decree of 
divorce to reduce the amount ordered paid as support 
money, and that Plaintiff should be estopped to seek a 
judgment against him for $4,605.00, or for any amount. 
The Defendant testified in support of this allegation 
(R. 36-37). The Plaintiff denied that she had made such 
an agreement (R. 52). 
The trial court obviously 1nisapplied the law ap-
plicable to the point at issue. At one point Plaintiff ob-
jected to further testimony concerning the bills paid by 
the Defendant to protect the Plaintiff from garnisheeing 
creditors. The trial court sustained the objection, stating 
"I don't see that there would be any consider-
ation for her trying to get him to pay the bills. 
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Paragraph Six of the decree says he shall." (R. 
38). 
Again Defendant offered the siste,r of the Defendant 
Donna Petty, as a witness to testify that the Plaintiff had 
told her that as long as the Defendant paid the hills and 
paid what he could that she would be satisfied. The Court 
refus·ed to permit her to testify and stated: 
"That would he no consideration for that type 
of promise." (R. 60). 
It is Defendant's position that in such a matter the 
defense need not be founded upon consideration but is 
properly based upon estoppel. 
In the case of Larsen v. Larsen, 5 Utah 2d 224, 300 
P. 2d 596, the Court stated: 
"A mother by her actions or representations 
or both may preclude herself from recovering 
pastdue installments of support money to reim· 
burse her for the money which she has spent for 
the support of the children where the father's 
failure to make such payments was induced by her 
representation or action and where as a result of 
representations or actions the father has been 
lulled into changing his position which he would 
not have done but for such representations, and 
that as a result of such failure to pay and change 
in his condition it would cause him great hardship 
and injustice if she is allowed to enforce the pay. 
ment of such back installments, she may be there-
by estopped from enforcing the payment for such 
back installments." 
The Defendant not only testified that the Plaintiff 
agreed to be satisfied with what he could pay in addition 
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to paying off joint obligations of the parties, but he also 
testified that until this proceeding was filed that she 
made no complaint of his inability to pay the full amount 
of $100.00 per rnonth and appeared to be satisfied with 
the payments he was making (R. 38). It is true that she 
testified that she complained eve·ry time she saw him that 
he was not paying enough (R. 59). He testified and 
she did not deny that until she filed her action he talked 
with the daughter practically every day on the telephone 
and visited the children of the parties once a week or at 
least every two weeks. The Defendant has been employed 
steadily since January, 1959, and she has not taken any 
action to obtain more than he has been paying or to obtain 
the full amount of the payn1ents that have accrued until 
this proceeding was filed. · 
The Defendant cannot contend that the judgment of 
the court is not based upon competent evidence, but the 
great weight of the evidence is contrary to the statement 
of the Plaintiff that she did not agree to be satisfied so 
long as the Defendant paid joint creditors and paid as 
much as he could reasonably afford. Moreover, it is ap-
parent that the Court misapplied the law applicable to 
this defense. 
POINT TWO 
The trial court erred in refusing to permit the sister 
of the Defendant, Donna Petty, to testify that the Plain-
tiff had told her that so long as the Defendant paid joint 
obligations and paid what he could for the support of the 
children that she would be satisfied. The court mis-
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POINT THREE 
The Court erred in finding the Defendant guilty of 
contempt. 
The Court stated that the Defendant was guilty of 
contempt for failure to pay the full amount of the suppo~rt 
money during the time that he has been employed at 
Sperry's (R. 60). Thus, his actions prior to that time 
need not he discussed. 
The testimony is that while he is at Sperry's he has 
earned from $50.00 per week take home pay to $68.00 per 
week take home pay (R. 28). During the period that 
he has been so employed he has never mis.sed a payment 
even though his payments have not been the full amQUJlt 
ordered paid (R. 38). The evidence shows that at the 
present time his expenses are: $10.00 per month payable 
to his sister on $2,000.00 of loans (R. 29); $71.00 per 
month rent; $60.00 pe;r month for groceries; $16.00 per 
month for utilities; $5.00 per month for barber; $10.00 
per month for clothes; $8.00 per month for laundry (R. 
30). He is obliged to maintain an automobile which was 
purchased and paid for entirely by his Wife, at a cost to 
him of $35.00 to $40.00 per month (R. 31). He testified 
that after paying such expenses and $60.00 per month to 
the Plaintiff and $10.00 per month to the children (R. 
32) that he has nothing left with which to pay more. 
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1_1lw foregoing payinents total $285.00 of his $300.00 
take home pay. It is apparent that the foregoing items of 
expense cannot cover all of his expenses as everyone has 
a multitude of expenses not embraced within the fore-
going category of expenses. 
In addition to Defendant paying Plaintiff $60.00 per 
month and giving the children $10.00 per month, the 
Plaintiff has received the benefit of taking the children 
as her dependents (R. 53). This give.s her an additional 
$20.00 or $21.00 per month benefit as her income tax is 
reduced by that amount. Thus, the $70.00 paid by De·-
fendant and the $20.00 which she has received the benefit 
of amounts to $90.00 pe~r month. In addition, without any 
order of Court so to do, the Defendant has. maintained 
medical insurance upon the children and there has been 
paid by the insurer for the benefit of the children within 
the last year or two $800.00 for medical expenses (R. 55-
56), thus relieving the Plaintiff of these medical costs, 
which greatly exceed the remaining difference1 between 
$90.00 per month and $100.00 perr month, or even a dif-
ference of $30.00 a month during the last two years, which 
is the full mnount of the difference between the $70.00 
per month which has been paid by the Defendant to the 
Plaintiff and the children and the $100.00 ordered paid. 
It thus appears that she has received the benefit of at 
least $100.00 per month during the past two years while 
he has been working for Sperry's. 
Considering the further fact that he has been in daily 
communication ·with the daughter of the parties and has 
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seen the two children of the parties at least every two 
weeks and usually every week during the past years, it 
seems inconceivable that the Court would find the De-
fendant in contempt of court under such circumstances 
and commit the Defendant to jail for thirty days there-
for. It is so contrary to the usual treatment accorded 
defendants in such a proceeding as the case at bar. 
Furthermore, the Defendant will, no doubt, lose his 
work if he. is required to spend thirty days in jail. 
POINT FOUR 
The trial court abused its discretion in committing 
the Defendant to jail for thirty days. The argument 
under Point Three is applicable to this point. 
POINT FIVE 
The trial court erred in denying the Defendant's 
petition for modification of the decree of divorce to re-
duce the amount of support money payable by the· De-
fendant to the Plaintiff. The trial court misapplied the 
law applicable to the point at issue. · 
The evidence concerning the Defendant's ability to 
pay has been set forth under Points One and Three, 
supra. In addition, the evidence shows that from tlie. time 
of the entry of the decree of divorce in February, 1956, 
to January, 1959, the Defendant was unable to maintain 
employment because of his physical condition. During 
that period of time his income was small when he· did work 
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and during a large part of the ti1ne he was obliged to 
depend upon his sister to n1aintain him (R. 29). At the 
time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce Plaintiff was 
not employed and had not been since she was married to 
Defendant. Within two months thereafter, she obtained 
work and ever since has received from $250.00 to $325.00 
per month (R. 28). This constitutes a material change 
of circumstances. 
Here again the Court 1nisapplied the law applicablP. 
to the point at issue. 
The testimony showed that the Plaintiff is paying 
$91.00 per month on the home in which she lives and 
$35.00 per week for food for herself, her mother and her 
children, and that her income totals $425.00 per month, 
including her take home pay of $275.00, the boy's earnings 
of at least $20.00 per month as she testified, the mother's 
contribution of $60.00 per month, and the moneys which 
have been furnished by the Defendant totalling $70.00 per 
month, leaving a balance after payment on the hmne and 
for food of $190.00 per month. 
The Plaintiff was asked what other things she needed 
that would require $200.00 per month. Without objection 
of counsel the Court interjected: 
''I don't care to hear it. I know what it takes. 
I don't care what she takes otherwise * * * If you 
want to confine it to what she needs for the kid-
dies, well and good, but what she needs for herself 
and her mother, I am not interested in it." (R. 56) 
Plaintiff was then asked to tell what she thinks she 
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requires besides food and rent. She answered, "Since my 
sister left I have to have a car." (R. 56). The Court 
again without objection of Plaintiff's couns.el interjected: 
"I am not interested in what this lady has to 
have. She can be rich as Croesus. She is getting 
no alimony. I am only talking about the Defend-
ant's duty to support the kiddies, what she needs 
for the kids." (R. 57) 
It appears that her income has been wholly adequate 
for the support of the children and herself a~ she made 
no testimony otherwise. Apparently she was satisfied 
until ''Since my sister left I have to have a car.'' 
It is the. position of the Defendant that the mother 
owes an obligation to the children and that if the father's 
financial condition is such that he cannot live reasonably 
and pay the full amount necessary to support the chil-
dren, the mqther, being able, should assist in the support 
of the children. 
The statmnent contained in Wallace v. Wallace, 9 
Utah 2d 237, 342 P. 2d 103, is to the point:· 
"The fact that the marriage is · terminated 
does not obliterate whatever results it may have 
produced. They cannot be wished away nor ig-
nored. Both spouses continue to sustain some du-
ties toward each other and to the children. It is 
important to remember that these duties do not 
all run ·one way; they are re·ciprocal and must be 
faced up to if the proper objective is to be served. 
The purpose of the divorce decree and of the con-
duct of the parties under it must he calculated to-
ward the solution of existing problems and sus-
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tenance of the parties so they can reconstruct their 
lives on the most wholesome foundation possible 
under the circtunstances. The purpose of the pro-
vision for alirnony and support money is to pro-
vide for the current needs and not to allow the 
beneficiary to sit by and permit a burdensome 
debt to accumulate and then use it to harness the 
Defendant so that he cannot hold a job or live are-
spectable existence. Even though the decree may 
impose the responsibility of support upon the 
husband primarily, the wife also has a duty to see 
that the children are furnished with the necessi-
ties of life. It is because of the recognition of the 
continuing obligations of the parties for the wel-
fare of the children that the statute provides that 
they are subject to such further orders of the court 
with respect thereto as the court shall deem rea-
sonably proper. Section 30-3-5, U.C.A., 1953." 
The Legislature of Utah apparently is in accord with 
this statement made in Wallace v. Wallace. Section 30-
3-3 provides : 
''30-3-3. Ternporary Alirnony and Suit :Money 
The eourt may order either party to pay to the 
clerk a sum of money for the separate support 
and maintenance of the adverse party and the 
ehildren and to enable such party to defend the 
action.'' 
In 19 C.J. Section 817, Page 356, the following state-
ment of the law is made: 
"The reasonableness of the amount· allowed 
for the support . of the children depends largely 
upon the needs of the children and the financial 
eondition of the father, including his earning cap-
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acity. If a Inother to whmn custody of a child has 
been awarded has means of he:r own, she may be 
held to contribute toward its support and thus 
diminish the amount to be paid by the father, the 
rule in this respect not differing materially from 
that applied in the case of an allowance of per-
manent alimony. In such cases the court should, 
therefore, consider the ability of the parents, the 
care and attention the mother must give the chil-
dren, the assistance the mother will receive from 
the children, if any, and all the surrounding facts 
and circumstances and equalize the burden be-
tween them as nearly as may be." 
Defendant submits that the Judgment and Order of 
the Trial ·Court should be reversed and the cause re-
manded for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
:MoFFAT, IVERSON AND ELGGREN 
By J. GRANT IVERSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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